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Chapter 4

Formulary Apportionment and
International Tax Rules
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Zachée Pouga Tinhaga

Any proposal to adopt unitary taxation (UT) of multinationals has to
contend with whether such taxation is compatible with existing international
tax rules, and, in particular, with the bilateral tax treaty network. Indeed,
some researchers have argued that the separate accounting (SA) method
and the arm’s length standard (ALS), introduced in the early twentieth
century,1 are so embodied in the treaties that they form part of customary
international law, and are binding even in the absence of a treaty. We
disagree, because the unitary approach is just as widely embodied in most
of the current international tax treaties, and, where there are no treaties,
national laws allow for a unitary approach to taxation. In this chapter we will
argue that UT can be compatible with most existing tax treaties, and that
developing countries, in particular, can implement it in most cases with or
without a tax treaty and in accordance with their domestic laws.

UT and the existing treaty network
Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties, which
assumes the SA method because it addresses the commercial or financial
relations between associated enterprises.2 Initially, the term permanent
establishment (PE) was meant to include separate entities (subsidiaries).
However, in 1933 the League of Nations introduced Article 5, ancestor
to the current Article 9 of the Model,3 where separate enterprises were
no longer considered PEs. If UT were adopted, Article 9 would become
irrelevant in those situations to which UT applies (i.e. where a unitary
business is found to exist), because UT ignores the transactions between
related parties, and treats them instead as part of a single enterprise.
Instead, UT would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7),
‘[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting State
controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of the other
Contracting State… shall not of itself constitute either company a
permanent establishment of the other’. However, it is well established
that a dependent agent can be a PE (see Art. 5(5)), and whether an
agent is dependent is based on whether the principal exercises legal and
economic control over the agent.4 ‘An agent that is subject to detailed
instructions regarding the conduct of its operations or comprehensive
control by the enterprise is not legally independent’.5
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In the case of a modern, integrated multinational enterprise (MNE)
that operates as a unitary business, a strong argument can be made
in most cases that the parent of the MNE exercises both legal and
economic control over the operations of the subsidiaries, especially
where the subsidiaries bear no real risk of loss, and acquire goods and
services exclusively or almost exclusively from the parent or other related
corporations. The existence of Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in
most important operational decisions being centralised. In that case, the
subsidiaries should be regarded as dependent agents of the parent. Such
a finding is in fact made with increasing frequency in both developed and
developing countries (Le Gall 2007).
If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Article 7(2) of the treaties
requires the attribution of the same profits to the subsidiary ‘that it might
be expected to make if it were a distinct and independent enterprise
engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or similar
conditions’. Arguably, the application of UT satisfies this arm’s length
condition, because in the absence of precise comparables, which almost
never exist, it is not possible to determine exactly what profits would have
been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.
When the US adopted the Comparable Profit Method and Profit Split
in the 1994 transfer pricing regulations, some countries objected that it
was violating the treaties because these methods did not rely on exact
comparables to find the arm’s length price. However, these objections
eventually subsided, and the OECD endorsed similar methods in its
transfer pricing guidelines, and more recently granted them equivalent
status to the traditional methods. The US has always maintained that
both the Comparable Profit and Profit Split Methods satisfy the arm’s
length standard despite the lack of precise comparables (and in the
case of profit split, using no comparables at all to allocate any residual
profits). Similarly, the US has maintained that the ‘super-royalty rule’
of the Internal Revenue Code section 482 (which requires royalties to
be ‘commensurate with the income’ from an intangible, and therefore
subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the arm’s length
standard, even though no comparables can be found to show that such
adjustments are ever made by unrelated parties.
Before the recent changes to the OECD Model Convention (MC), it
was therefore quite plausible to argue that UT was compatible with the
treaties if the subsidiary were as a factual matter legally or economically
dependent on the parent so as to constitute a PE. In addition, a country
that wished to adopt UT could rely on the language of the OECD MC
Article 7(4): ‘Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to
determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment on
the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the enterprise to its
various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
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State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an apportionment
as may be necessary; the method of apportionment adopted shall,
however, be such that the result shall be in accordance with the principles
contained in this Article’.
Since it can be argued that in the absence of comparables the result
reached under UT is equivalent to what could be reached under SA, this
language seems to permit the use of UT for dependent agent PEs.
However, the OECD in 2010 adopted changes to Article 7 of the MC
that would make this argument more difficult to sustain. Specifically, the
OECD adopted the ‘authorised OECD approach’ to the attribution of
profits to a PE, which treats a PE as the equivalent to a subsidiary, and
has suggested that the transfer pricing guidelines that explicitly reject
UT should be applied to PEs. In addition, the OECD has followed the
US lead and deleted Article 7(4) from its MC. However, not all OECD
countries accepted these changes, which were also rejected by developing
countries, and the UN model still contains Article 7(4).
In fact, the vast majority of existing actual treaties have not been revised
to incorporate those changes. In particular, our research shows that many
developing country treaties contain Article 7(4), even when the treaties
are with OECD members.6 We identified 174 such treaties by developing
countries that contain this language, including recent treaties such as
India-Lithuania (2011), India-Nepal (2011), Korea-Panama (2010), and
treaties with OECD members such as India-Sweden, India-UK, MexicoUK, and Sri Lanka-US. In all of those cases, or in the absence of a
treaty, countries should be free to implement UT in accordance with the
analysis set out above.
Customary international law
Nor does the argument of customary international law impede the
application of a UT approach. The argument is based on the contention
that because SA and the ALS are embodied in all the treaties, they
should be considered binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not
enough to create a customary international law ban on UT, since Article
7(4) is embodied as well. Furthermore, it should be noted that model tax
treaties do not, in any way or form, create a ‘right to tax’.7 The key issue
is the actual practice of states – what countries actually do – as domestic
laws reign supreme in the area of taxation, and many of them follow UT
approaches in practice. In addition, countries should be free to follow the
UN Model, which does not adopt the changes made by the OECD, and
which is also widely followed.
Finally, it can be argued that even the OECD may be revising its
approach. The authorised OECD approach may have marked the high
point of OECD commitment to SA. With the unfolding of the base
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project,8 which is influenced by large
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developing countries like China and India, it is possible that the OECD
may be stepping back from its total commitment to SA. Specifically,
the adoption under BEPS of country-by-country reporting (which was
already required for extractive industries in the US) can be the basis
for implementation of UT.9 This development is very important for
developing counties, as many rely heavily on extractive industries. The
requirements of country-by-country reporting will allow a profound
change in taxation of the major industry in the developing world: the
extractive industry.
Does Article 7 preclude application of UT to entire MNEs?
One important question raised by Durst (Durst 2013a: 8) is whether
the requirement that profits be attributable to a PE under Article 7 of
the model treaties means that if UT is applied, it must be done on an
activity-by-activity basis. Otherwise, profits would be attributed to the
PE that have nothing to do with it, because the PE is not engaged in
the activity that generates these profits. However, one would rather not
make this assumption, because allowing an MNE to split its activities
among different subsidiaries is notoriously hard to combat, and facilitates
precisely the kind of profit shifting that developing countries, in
particular, have a hard time policing.
In our opinion, the phrase ‘attributable to a permanent establishment’
does not preclude attribution of global profits of an MNE to a PE under
whatever formula is adopted for UT purposes. The reason is that once a
functional analysis is performed, and whatever can be attributed to the
various functions by using either comparables or a proxy, such as a fixed
percentage of costs (Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst 2009), the remaining
residual can be allocated in any way we wish, since it is attributable to the
entire MNE.
Transfer pricing adjustments frequently result in a residual that cannot
be allocated under the traditional functional analysis, because it results
from cost savings that inhere in the relationship of the group members
to each other. The classic example is the US case involving Bausch and
Lomb (B and L).10 B and L developed an unpatented technology that
enabled it to manufacture contact lenses at a cost of $2.50 per lens,
when its competitors had costs of $7.50 per lens. B and L contributed
the knowhow to its Irish subsidiary, to enable it to manufacture the
lenses. The question facing the US court was whether to accept B and
L’s view that the Comparable Uncontrolled Price method should apply
to determine the price charged by the Irish subsidiary to its parent for
lenses based on a comparison with prices charged by independent lens
manufacturers, despite the difference in production costs. The IRS
argued that the residual profit from the know-how belonged to the US
parent that developed it, but the court rejected that view because the
residual profit inhered in the relationship between the parties. Had B and
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L Ireland been unrelated to its parent, the know-how would have been
disclosed, the competitors would have used it, and the residual profit
would have disappeared.
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines do not say what should be done
with residuals under the Profit Split Method. The US regulations followed
the White Paper,11 in assuming that any residual results from intangibles
and allocating the residual to where the intangibles were developed. This
is a view that favours US revenue interests, because more intangibles
are developed in the US than elsewhere, but not surprisingly it has not
been accepted by other OECD members. Nor is it congruent with the
facts, since residuals can result from other reasons, such as cost savings
from synergies or advantages of scale, and they usually inhere in the
relationship among the group members and cannot be allocated to any
one of them.
The OECD’s preferred method of applying the Profit Split Method is to
analyse the functions, assets and risk of each member of the affiliated
group. However, in the context of residuals this method also proves to
be illusory. A functional analysis can only be applied to those functions
that can be assigned to the group members, such as production or
distribution, but it does not help with residuals that result from the
relationship among the group members. Assets can include intangibles,
which are usually the most valuable assets of a modern MNE, but
intangibles also get their value from the relationship among the group
members, as illustrated by the B and L case. This makes it very difficult
for them to be allocated to either where they were developed or where
they are exploited. The Glaxo case, in which the IRS and HMRC
disagreed about whether the profit from selling Zantac, a drug developed
in the UK, into the US market were attributable to the intangibles
embodied in the drug itself or those used in Glaxo’s marketing, resulted
in massive double taxation.12
Risk is the trickiest concept of all. Recent case studies by the US Joint
Committee on Taxation (US Congress 2010) reveal a model in which
the entrepreneurial risk for a product is assigned to an affiliate in a
low tax jurisdiction, and the manufacturing and distribution of the
product in high tax jurisdictions are done on a contract manufacturing
and commissionaire basis. But it is not clear what the allocation of
entrepreneurial risk means among related parties. If a product fails
because of technological change or defects in manufacturing or
environmental hazards, the risk is effectively borne by the entire MNE –
or more accurately by its management, who risk being fired, and by its
shareholders, who see the stock price plummet.
Under UT, these issues can be solved by using the formula to allocate
the residual by the Profit Split Method. The specific formula used can
be negotiated, as discussed in other chapters in this book, and by Durst
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(2014c). But in our opinion it is clear that whatever formula is decided
upon should be applied under UT to the entire profit of the integrated
MNE, and not divided into separate activities, and that this would be
perfectly congruent with Article 7.
UT and developing countries
What can a developing country do to implement UT? In the absence of
a treaty, or in the event that the treaty contains Article 7(4) language, the
biggest obstacle to UT implementation may be access to information.
The recent redraft of the UN Transfer Pricing Manual recommends that
among the documentation that a tax administration should request
for a transfer pricing audit should be the ‘Group global consolidated
basis profit and loss statement and ratio of taxpayer’s sales towards
group global sales for five years’ (para. 8.6.9.12). This provides a good
basis for application of UT. The development of a global template
for country-by-country reports by MNEs, mandated by the G20 and
developed as part of the OECD’s BEPS project, would also facilitate
such an approach. The rejection of UT in the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines is based on its definition of formulary apportionment as
‘applying a formula fixed in advance’. This leaves considerable scope for
adoption of UT approaches with ad hoc formulas, which are not based
on a fixed formula.
Specifically, allocation according to operating expenses would be clearer
and easier to administer, and most importantly would fit within the
current rules of international tax. We have argued that in the context
of the Profit Split Method, the residual profit cannot be allocated on the
basis of comparables, and therefore can be allocated based on operating
expenses without deviating from the ALS (Avi-Yonah et al. 2009). This
would entail first assigning to each country an estimated market return
on the tax deductible expenses incurred by the multinational group in
that country.
Developing countries should therefore be encouraged to draft their
transfer pricing laws to include powers to adjust the accounts of any
foreign-owned local company or branch, if the revenue authority
considers that its accounts do not fairly reflect the profits earned locally,
to bring the taxable profits into line with those that such a business would
be expected to earn, having regard to (a) similar businesses either in that
country or elsewhere, and/or (b) the relationship of the local business
to the worldwide activities of the corporate group of which it is a part.
This would involve analysis and comparison of provisions in the tax
laws of appropriate countries. A good model would be Section 482 of
the US Internal Revenue Code, which predates the ALS and is very
open-ended.13
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Conclusion
The transition from SA to UT is likely to be a long process, and it may
ultimately require renegotiating treaties or even drafting a multilateral
treaty like the EU’s Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base.
However, a good beginning can be made now by exploring how
developing countries can adopt UT principles within the context of the
existing treaty network. This paper has endeavoured to show that such
approaches are quite feasible, because most developing countries are
not bound by the authorised OECD approach to Article 7, and even
the OECD may be reconsidering its approach in the context of the
BEPS project.
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Notes
1.

The reports to the League of Nations of 1927-1933, which resulted in
the first model tax conventions, were reprinted in a Legislative History
of US Tax Conventions, and are now available online in the Digital
Collections of the University of Sydney; for a brief account of the
history see Picciotto (2013), esp. pp.10-15.

2.

The quoted articles are identical in all the tax treaty models except when
the differences are discussed in the text.

3.

See League of Nations Fiscal Committee (1933), Annex, Art. 5.

4.

See, e.g. Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd v. Administracion General del Estado,
Case No. STS/202/2012 (Spanish Supreme Court Jan. 12) (Swiss
principal had PE in Spain through an affiliated Spanish company;
activity of the subsidiary was directed, organised and managed in a
detailed manner by the principal); Salad Dressing, Fiscal Court BadenWurttemberg, 3 K 54/93, Internationales Steuerrecht 1997 (Swiss
principal had a PE at the premises of an unrelated German contract
manufacturer based on detailed instruction by principal); Milcal Media
Limited, Court of Appeal, Stockholm, Case nos. 7453-54-02 (2005)
(Cyprus principal had a PE through Swedish subsidiary because it was
subject to detailed instructions and control); eFunds Corp. v. ADIT, Case
45 DTR 345 / 42 SOT 165, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi; Lucent
Technologies v. DCIT, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 2008 (US parent
company had a service PE in India); and the cases cited by Le Gall (2007).

5.

U.S. Treasury (2006: Art. 5(6)).

6.

See Appendix A of Avi-Yonah and Pouga Tinhaga (2014).

7.

Vogel (1997: 26) and OECD (1958: 12).

8.

See final BEPS reports (OECD 2015a).

9.

See BEPS final report on country-by-country reporting, available at
www.oecd.org/tax/transfer-pricing-documentation-and-country-bycountry-reporting-action-13-2015-final-report-9789264241480en.htm (last retrieved 26 July 2016).

10. Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. C.I.R., 933 F.2d 1084.
11. US Treasury (1988) (a US Treasury study of transfer pricing
methodology that resulted in the development of the Comparable
Profits Method and Profit Split).
12. GlaxoSmithKlineHoldings (Americas) Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner,
No. 5750-04 (T.C. Apr. 2).
13. ‘In any case of two or more organizations, trades, or businesses (whether
or not incorporated, whether or not organized in the United States,
and whether or not affiliated) owned or controlled directly or indirectly
by the same interests, the Secretary may distribute, apportion, or
allocate gross income, deductions, credits, or allowances between or
among such organizations, trades, or businesses, if he determines that
such distribution, apportionment, or allocation is necessary in order to
prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any of such
organizations, trades, or businesses.’ IRC s. 482.
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